
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Consistency in Organization (updated)
IZA DP No. 5644
April 2011
Ekkehart Schlicht 






University of Munich 















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  








Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 









Consistency in Organization (updated)
* 
 
Internal organization relies heavily on psychological consistency requirements. This thought 
has been emphasized in modern compensation theory, but has not been extended to 
organization theory. The perspective sheds new light on several topics in the theory of the 
firm, like the boundaries of the firm, the importance of fairness concerns within firms, the 
attenuation of incentives, or the role of routines and incentives. It implies a perceptional 





The paper develops the idea that the organization of a firm’s internal activity relies on 
psychological consistency requirements. As a consequence, fairness considerations are of 
paramount importance, and the limits of the firm are determined by the requirements of a 
coherent corporate culture. 
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remarks on the efficiency-enabling aspects of fairness that builds on Herbert Simon’s (1951) theory of 
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1 Small Numbers
Coordination in a well-matched team is typically characterized by specializa-
tion of the team members and the absence of relevant competition for each
specialist. In such a setting, market coordination seems less useful. It would
invite strategic behavior, and would necessitate protective measures to shield
against such tactics. Each team member could threaten to block the gains from
cooperation unless paid a larger share of the surplus. The potential conﬂicts and
concomitant safeguards involve sunk costs, to be counted as transaction costs.
Such transaction costs are quite different from – and more important than – the
costs “of discovering what the relevant prices are,” as there are many ways of
splitting any surplus, and there is no clear-cut way for “discovering” any set
of relevant prices. The costs for settling disputes may be considerable in any
small-number setting unless organizational features and ﬁrm-speciﬁc norms are
implemented that reduce higgling and haggling.
Organizational features and ﬁrm-speciﬁc norms may curb rent-seeking ac-
tivity by ruling out some alternatives or rendering them more costly to pursue.
A policy, for example, that requires equal treatment of all employees according
to certain principles restrains the individual worker from seeking an exception,
because all concessions made to him will generalize to other workers. This ren-
ders it more costly for the ﬁrm to make such concessions, and less promising for
the individual worker to request them. As a result, rent-seeking activity and as-
sociated transaction costs are reduced, and the employment relationship becomes
more efﬁcient ex ante as well as ex post. We can expect organizational solutions
to outcompete market solutions in such cases.1 More generally, coordination
within ﬁrms pertains to well-matched teams that entail, almost by deﬁnition,
small-number problems, and ﬁrms that rely on nonmarket organization may
1 Similar constraints on bargaining may arise in markets as well, but will, as a rule, be less
powerful and are disregarded in the following in order to simplify the exposition.
2obtain better results than the market could achieve. As a consequence, prices are
rarely used within ﬁrms to coordinate the division of labor. Even if payments
serve as incentives, they do not perform any market-clearing function.2
2 Markets, Hierarchies, and Custom
Behavior within an organization is motivated and controlled differently from
what occurs in the market. Psychological consistency molds behavior and is
of central importance for internal organization. But before developing this
thought, let us consider brieﬂy a position that denies the theoretical usefulness
of distinguishing between markets and ﬁrms in terms of different modes of
motivation and control. According to this view, all behavior, whether occurring
in the market or within ﬁrms, is governed by incentives, and a ﬁrm is to be
interpreted as a specialized market, rather than a categorically different orga-
nizational form.3 As Alchian and Demsetz explain: “Telling an employee to
type this letter rather than to ﬁle that document is like my telling a grocer to
sell me this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread.”4 According to this
view, no useful analytical distinction can be drawn between command and free
choice, even if people in real life happen to make such a distinction. People do
not change their nature when entering a ﬁrm. Whether inside or outside a ﬁrm,
their behavior is controlled by the same behavioral tendencies. If they behave
differently within the ﬁrm or in the marketplace, this is to be attributed to the
different sets of incentives provided. Human behavior is always to be analyzed
in terms of (given) preferences and constraints. I shall refer to this view as the
the principal–agent view of the ﬁrm, and I am going to criticize it.
I accept the thesis that people do not change their nature when entering
a ﬁrm, but I take them as norm-guided to much larger extent within ﬁrms
2 Schlicht (1998, 229ff.)
3 Holmstrom (1982)
4 Alchian and Demsetz (1972, 277)
3than in the market.5 It is not only incentives and constraints that determine
behavior; rather perceptions of entitlements and obligation inﬂuence action as
well, and ﬁrms use normative structures that create entitlements and obligations
for purposes of internal coordination that are absent or strongly attenuated in
markets, and this enables them to outperform markets.
Many writers have rejected the principal–agent view of the ﬁrm, often im-
plicitly. Ronald Coase is outspoken, however. He draws a distinction between a
principal–agent relationship and a master–servant relationship and cites Batt:
“... that which distinguishes an agent from a servant is not the absence or
presence of a ﬁxed wage, or the payment only of commission on business done,
but rather the freedom with which an agent may carry out his employment.”6
From this he concludes that the employment contract differs from a princi-
pal–agent relationship. It is a “master–servant” relationship, involving “control”
and “direction.” I take it that “control” and “direction” refer to normatively
supported ways of affecting behavior.
Herbert Simon reiterated the point that the employment contract establishes
an authority relation, and Oliver Williamson followed his lead, in effect taking
up Marx’s distinction between the social division of labor in the market and the
division of labor in manufacture.7 Simon drew a distinction between markets and
hierarchies and pointed out that the market will select that mode of coordination
that minimizes overall production costs – a view which I am going to accept in
this paper.
The dichotomy between markets and hierarchies found in Marx, Coase,
Simon, and Williamson is to be complemented by taking account of duty and
custom. Harvey Leibenstein has highlighted this when depicting the ﬁrm as a
network of interrelated jobs. Each job is associated with duties and responsibili-
ties, entitlements and obligations. The organization of work is achieved, in his
view, by the way in which appropriate norms, attached to jobs, govern behavior.8
5 The view advanced here builds in part on Isaac et al. (1991), who emphasize that institutions
(and therefore ﬁrms) frame fairness perceptions that entail strong behavioral effects. See also
Schlicht (1998) for further discussion.
6 Coase (1937, 404), Batt (1929, 6)
7 Simon (1951), Williamson (1985), Marx (1867, xv.4).
8 Leibenstein (1965)
4A closely related argument has been invoked by Nelson and Winter. They
start, like Williamson, with the observation that the market does not work well
in settings of idiosyncratic exchange. There may initially be a quarrel among the
team members for obtaining larger shares of the surplus at the expense of the
others, but eventually a “truce” will emerge, which is maintained and defended
by everybody because “each member strives to protect his interests by standing
prepared to deliver a ﬁrm rebuff not only to actions by others that clearly
threaten his interests, but also to actions that might be quite innocuous were it
not for their possible interpretation as probes of his alertness or determination
to defend his rights under a truce”.9 For such reasons, everybody defends
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc norms and customs even in cases where he is not personally
affected.
3 Entitlements, Obligations, and Organizational Equilibrium
The above discussion can be developed as follows. In a ﬁrst step, an organi-
zation could be interpreted as a set of conventions. But why do people obey
these conventions? One answer would be to think of a set of self-sustaining
conventions that everybody obeys because it is in everybody’s interest to follow
these conventions provided everybody else does the same.10 This view may
be adequate for dealing with pure coordination problems, like driving on the
right-hand side of the road. It is the easy case and does not involve any problem.
Such a system would work automatically, and there would be no further need
for governance, and hardly any need for a ﬁrm as we know it.
The small-number problems arising in teams give rise, however, to coor-
dination problems of a different kind. They require a splitting of the surplus
accruing from cooperation. They involve potential conﬂict. An organization
must cope with these problems. A convention to split a surplus according to a
certain rule cannot easily be self-enforcing, because some team members may
be ﬁrst movers. They could try to increase their share in the surplus, knowing
that it would be rational for the others to accommodate this step. The threat to
9 Nelson and Winter (1982, 111)
10 Kreps (1990)
5cease cooperating would be irrational for the later movers. In other words, the
idea of viewing an organization as a set of conventions that are maintained out
of self-interest of the participants seems very problematic.
Yet evidence suggests that people actually do behave “irrationally” if they
feel cheated. They try to defend what they perceive as their entitlements, even
if this involves substantial costs to them. Effective norms are defended in this
manner. Strategic behavior is channeled by these ﬁrm-speciﬁc norms. If the
ﬁrm adheres to principles of equal treatment of equals, for example, a worker
will anticipate that any concession made to him will induce other workers to
seek the same advantage. Hence he will rather look for fostering his own
advantage within the given set of norms and principles. This channels his
activity. Improvements in governance, in the sense of implementing better
norms, can induce better performance.
Further, effective norms shape compliance. They induce entitlements and
obligations. Entitlements are rights, as perceived by the individuals. They are
not, however, abstract legal rights. Rather, they denote the subjectively perceived
rights that go along with a motivational disposition to defend them. Obligations
are the counterparts of entitlements. They refer to claims by others that are sub-
jectively accepted by the individual, and go along with a motivational disposition
to respect these claims.11 Both entitlements and obligations are brought about
by a set of established rules. They derive from regularities perceived in the past
and in the group, and they bring about norms and customs. Governance can be
improved by establishing regularities that give rise to appropriate entitlements
and obligations.12
Given a set of norms and customs within a ﬁrm, and a preparedness of the
members to defend the entailed entitlements and honor the implied obligations,
it may be tempting to view behavior in analogy to the simple coordination
problem, but on a higher level. Conforming to ﬁrm-speciﬁc norms may be
construed as individually rational if everybody expects everybody else to de-
fend these conventions. However, the behavioral effect of such rules cannot
11 Schlicht (1998, 24).
12 Some condemn such thoughts as involving manipulation of the employees, and interfering
with their free choices. See Schlicht (2004) for a discussion of this issue.
6be reduced to incentives. Rather, the rules generate incentives because they
elicit entitlements and obligations and induce behaviors that will mutually be
taken into account. The resulting organizational equilibrium, as governed by
entitlements and obligations, may be viewed as a “truce,” as Nelson and Winter
have proposed. It seems to me, however, that this parlance wrongly invokes
the idea that organizational equilibrium is built on latent conﬂict.13 It wrongly
suggests that mutual entitlements and obligations are only obeyed because they
are backed up by threats. This is a misleading way of looking at organizational
equilibrium, because truce is usually short-lived, both within organizations and
between nations, and prone to transform either into peace or into war after a
while. It seems thus more appropriate to describe organizational equilibrium as
peace, where conﬂicts have settled down and a possible initial truce has engen-
dered a mutually accepted arrangement that is defended by everybody, similar to
the way in which hierarchies or territorial claims are defended after settlement.
An analogy can be found in the way in which pecking orders and territori-
ality are established among animals. Consider the establishment of a pecking
order among hens. There may be initial ﬁghts, but after a while a pecking
order is established and only rarely put into question. The hens generalize
apparently from the outcome of one ﬁght to the outcome of the next one and
avoid unnecessary ﬁghting. Or consider territoriality. There may be an initial
ﬁght, and the stronger individual might occupy a certain territory. It will defend
its territory and will chase away potential intruders, but once the territorial
boundaries are established real ﬁghts will be rare. The ownership effect will
induce the owner of a territory to win almost any ﬁght – even against stronger
intruders. It has obtained, so to speak, an entitlement in the territory, which
induces it to defend it more ﬁercely than it would ﬁght as an intruder, and the
intruders’ aggressiveness is muted by the partial recognition of the territorial
rights of the owner.14 In this way, ownership generates preferences, as well as
incentives. Regarding preferences, it renders the owner more aggressive and
13 This applies to the radical theory of the ﬁrm as well; see (Marglin, 1974). Oliver Williamson
(1980) has commented on that.
14 See the discussion and references in Schlicht (1998, 11-115, 172-175). Biologists describe the
ownership effect as rendering the owner more aggressive than the intruder; see Maynard Smith
(1978).
7the intruder more yielding. As both the owner and the intruder will take this
effect into account, this changes their incentives for maintaining the territory,
or invading it. The tendency is strengthened among social animals by the way
in which the members of a group maintain or change alliances, and a similar
social ampliﬁcation must be expected within any social organization.15
4 Consistency
Yet a ﬁrm’s internal organization is not fully reducible to routines, norms, and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc customs. The element of command – emphasized rightly by Coase
and Williamson – is of great importance as well, but simply adding hierarchy
and command to routines, norms, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc customs will not sufﬁce to
compleat the picture, as all elements interact strongly, and monetary incentives
play a role as well. In the remaining part of the paper I shall comment on the
nature of this interaction.16
My main thesis is that the actual working of an organization depends
strongly on aspects of psychological consistency. The term refers to an overall
match between various organizational features, principles, and tacit understand-
ings. It plays an important part in modern compensation theory, but has much
broader signiﬁcance with regard to organizational matters.17 It bundles com-
mand, incentives, and custom together and implies a strong interaction between
command, ﬁrm-speciﬁc norms, and incentives.
Consider the starting point of Coase’s discussion of the employment re-
lationship. He notes correctly: “If a workman moves from department Y to
department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because
he is ordered to do so.”18 The foreman is well advised, however, not to issue
arbitrary orders, even if they remain within the limits set by the employment
15 See De Waal (1983) on the importance of forming alliances in groups of chimpanzees, and
Dunbar and Schutz (2007) for the “social brain” thesis.
16 See also Schlicht (1998, 227-233), where the interaction of monetary incentives, custom, and
command is interpreted as “chemical interaction” in the sense of Mill (2004, iii.x.4).
17 Milkovich and Newman (1999), Baron and Kreps (1999).
18 Coase (1937, 378)
8contract. He must be entitled to order the workman to move, and it will be his
duty not to issue inappropriate orders. The authority of the foreman and the
obedience of the worker will be hurt if the foreman gives incoherent orders. The
consistency of his behavior is tied up with his competence, as perceived by his
subordinates, which is an important element in eliciting authority. He must, for
instance, issue similar orders under similar circumstances.
If the worker in department Y is idle each afternoon, but helpful in depart-
ment X, the foreman will be bound to send the workman each afternoon to
department X. After a while, such an order will appear redundant. The workman
will know and go by himself, and he might fear reprisal if he does not help in
department X in the afternoon even if not explicitly ordered to do so. He will
begin to see this as his duty.
Authority is in this way tied up with job roles and responsibilities. Every
order and every decision creates a precedent. It molds entitlements and obliga-
tions and strengthens or weakens authority. As a consequence, every order and
decision must be seen as both directing resources and shaping ﬁrm-speciﬁc cus-
toms. While a command entered into the keyboard of a computer may be issued
without affecting the response of the computer to other commands, this does
not hold true within a ﬁrm. Within a ﬁrm, however, every command creates the
expectation that similar future situations will be handled in a similar manner,
and weakens behaviors that appear inconsistent with the command. Each com-
mand creates entitlements and obligations. It induces generalization. This is of
obvious productive advantage in so far as it automatizes certain adaptations, but
may be of disadvantage in case some generalizations are unwarranted.19
19 In this sense, Walsh (2010) distinguishes between “coercive command” that is based on threats,
and “command as an articulation of rules that have been voluntarily committed to.” While
large segments of economic writings emphasize the ﬁrst meaning, he argues that command
within ﬁrms usually takes the latter form. It is seen as rule-based and ultimately grounded in
situation-speciﬁc requirements; see also Follett (1940, 59) and Brady and Walsh (2008).
95 The Boundaries of the Firm
Oliver Williamson has emphasized the “chronic puzzle” about the limits of the
ﬁrm.20 Two ﬁrms A and B can do together whatever they could do separately –
and more. There is thus no inefﬁciency to be expected if ﬁrms A and B integrate;
we could rather expect some efﬁciency gains achievable by selective intervention.
The puzzle is that we do not ﬁnd ﬁrms getting larger and larger. Sometimes it
is successful to downsize or split. It must, therefore, sometimes be cheaper to
organize the sets of activities of A and B separately than jointly. As Williamson
put it, “the integrated ﬁrm cannot wholly replicate outside procurement in
‘business as usual’ respects. Instead, there are unavoidable side effects.”21
The aspect of consistency contributes to understanding some of these un-
avoidable side effects: While ﬁrms A and B can each develop a specialized set
of customs that are ﬁne-tuned to their particular needs, ﬁrm AB cannot handle
similar things differently in its departments A and B. That would hurt con-
sistency. It may still be possible to differentiate between departments, but in
many cases (such as compensation policies) this is very difﬁcult and costly to
sustain. It is a frequent occurrence that certain activities are outsourced for the
simple reason of making it possible to pay the outsourced workers differently
from what they would receive as regular employees. Janitors are outsourced in
order to save on wage payments; computer specialists are outsourced in order
to make it possible to pay them more.22 It is also common practice to hive off
the development of new products in skunkworks, with the explicit intention
to remove the constraints that would be unavoidable if the project would be
carried through within the ﬁrm.23 It has been even suggested that some highly
successful innovations have been left unexploited or handed over to other ﬁrms
because pursuing them would have created problems within the existing ﬁrm
organization.24 In these cases, the consistency requirement works as a constraint,
20 Williamson (1985, Ch. 6). This is also known as Stiglitz’(1991, 18) “centralization paradox.”
21 Williamson (1985, 138)
22 See Mücke (2002) for some illustrations.
23 Bower and Christensen (1995), Bommer et al. (2000), Leitl (2006).
24 Walsh (2008, 142).
10and disintegration may permit removing it. Conversely, integration induces the
consistency constraint as an unavoidable side effect.
6 The Perceptional Theory of the Firm
I have interpreted the ﬁrm as an organizational unit that relies on norms and
customs for coordination, rather than on market incentives. For such a system to
work, the boundaries of the ﬁrm must be recognizable for its members, because
they must know whether the ﬁrm-speciﬁc norms are valid or not. This implies a
perceptional theory of the ﬁrm: The ﬁrm is what the ﬁrm members perceive as
a ﬁrm. This perception frames and thereby triggers their behavior. Or, in the
terminology of Isaac, Mathieu and Zajac, ﬁrms and other institutions provide
institutional frames that activate certain behaviors rather than others.25
From this point of view, the boundaries of the ﬁrm relate to perceptional
boundaries: A ﬁrm is what people identify as a ﬁrm. This notion of the ﬁrm
is realistic, in the sense advocated by Coase: It “closely approximates the ﬁrm
as it is considered in the real world.”26 The relevance of the “perceptional,” or
“realistic,” notion of the ﬁrm derives from the fact that people base their actions
on their perceptions. This renders their perceptions economically relevant.
If a theorist argues that the perceptional view of the ﬁrm is too fuzzy
and vague, and a more clear-cut deﬁnition, such as the ﬁrm as a “nexus of
contracts,” or the ﬁrm as a “collection of assets,” is analytically more convenient
or fruitful, they must assume a priori that the notion of the ﬁrm entertained by
the economic subjects themselves does not carry behavioral implications.27 In
contrast, the consistency argument advanced here emphasizes the behavioral
entailment of perceptions, and implies that the notion of the ﬁrm would actually
be superﬂuous if it did not carry such behavioral implications.
25 Isaac et al. (1991)
26 Coase (1937, 404)
27 Jensen and Meckling (1976), Moore (1992)
117 Low-Powered Incentives
Williamson has contrasted the prevalence of low-powered incentives within
ﬁrms with the high-powered incentives prevalent in markets.28 While no a
priori reason can be given for ﬁrms not to deviate from markets in the other
direction and offer super-powered incentives, several reasons for the attenuation
of incentives within ﬁrms have been advanced. The consistency view adds some
further arguments for attenuation.
According to the consistency view, ﬁrms rely on norm-guided behavior. The
set of entitlements and obligations that regulates cooperation cannot be mixed
easily with incentives, because the provision of incentives changes entitlements
and obligations. Once a worker receives performance pay, this removes his
obligation to work fast on order. The presence of performance pay creates the
entitlement on the part of the worker to choose his own pace of work, and weak-
ens or removes his obligation to work as he is told.29 The theoretical argument
relates to the theory of self-attribution.30 It suggests, for instance, that incen-
tives may reduce cooperation, and this has been conﬁrmed experimentally.31
As ﬁrms must rely on norm-guided cooperation, and wage compression and an
attenuation of incentives may improve the workings of duty of command, such
features are to be expected.
8 Fairness as a Precondition for Proﬁt Seeking
The thought that norm-guided behavior is important within ﬁrms may also
be rephrased in a different way by building on Herbert Simon’s theory of the
28 Williamson (1985, 140)
29 This thought may help to understand the difference between incentives and command and may
contribute to resolve Clark’s(1984) puzzle that incentives that must be considered optimal from a
principal–agent perspective were replaced by authority in many capital-intensive factories in the
late nineteenth century. Only if authority works differently from incentives do these ﬁndings
make sense.
30 Schlicht (1998, Ch. 9)
31 Brown et al. 2002, Fehr and Gächter (2002)
12employment relationship.32 Consider two different tasks, A and B. Assume
initially that the worker is indifferent about whether to perform the one or the
other. An exchange contract would specify under which conditions the worker
would perform which. An employment contract would leave that unspeciﬁed.
The ﬁrm would be free to decide, according to the situation, which task the
worker is to perform. As long as the worker is indifferent between the tasks, he
will be indifferent between the exchange contract and an employment contract.
The ﬁrm, however, will prefer the employment contract, as this permits post-
poning the decision about which task to perform. It permits greater ﬂexibility.
The employment contract carries an option value, just as the holding of money
rather than some illiquid asset entails liquidity. This is, in a nutshell, Simon’s
explanation of the employment contract.
Consider now the case that the the worker is not indifferent between tasks A
and B but prefers task A. An employment contract faces the difﬁculty that the
worker may be hesitant to agree on entering a contract that leaves the choice
between A and B entirely in the hands of the ﬁrm, as he may fear of becoming
exploited by being ordered to work exclusively on the dreary task B. In order to
render an employment contract viable, the ﬁrm must credibly commit itself to
compensate the worker for additional toil. By offering extra payment for task B
(working at night, working abroad), the worker can be made indifferent between
the tasks, and the employment contract can serve the function of postponing the
decision about performing task A or task B.
From this point of view it it is no coincidence that businessmen talk about
“compensation” rather than “pay.” Practitioners aim for a consistent wage
structure that offers rewards in proportion to the time needed to perform a task,
and to the strain and attention required, rather than to bribe workers to perform
the one rather than the other task. The latter would undermine the possibility
of directing workers by command.
Another way to maintain the viability of the employment contract in cases
where workers are not indifferent between performing different tasks is to
implement practices that ﬁx the shares of the various tasks while maintaining
the ﬂexibility of timing – in our example, maintaining the shares of tasks A and
32 Simon (1951)
13B while leaving it to the ﬁrm’s discretion when to ask the worker to perform
task A or task B, respectively. A worker who has been assigned to the strenuous
task B for some time would obtain the “right” to be compensated by being
assigned preferentially to task A for a while, etc. This would, again, make the
workers ultimately indifferent between performing the different tasks. Such
practices relate obviously to fair treatment of the workers. The observation of
fairness requirements turns out to be a fundamental prerequisite for rendering
the employment contract viable and enabling its superior efﬁciency features.
Rather than posing a constraint on proﬁt seeking, as Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler see it, fairness turns out to be a precondition for proﬁt seeking.33
Lindbeck and Snower (2000) have observed a recent tendency away from
“Tayloristic” to “holistic” forms of the organization of work within ﬁrms and
argue that multitasking, job rotation, and demands on the versatility of labor
become increasingly important. According to the perspective developed here,
such a development would demand the removal of incentives that hinder such
holistic organization, and fairness as an enabler of efﬁcient coordination will
become even more essential in the future than it is to-day.34
Further, fairness in the employment contract – in the sense of offering
compensation for more arduous tasks, in one way or another – contributes not
only to the efﬁciency of the ﬁrm, but also to social efﬁciency, as compensating
wage differentials bring about product prices that correctly reﬂect the cost of
labor used for producing the various products.
33 Kahneman et al. (1986)
34 In contrast, Lindbeck and Snower (2001, 1854) speculate regarding holistic work organization:
“Under multi-tasking, wages have a dual role: they inﬂuence both the number of people employed
and their time allocations across tasks” and conclude from that that this would require differenti-
ated and unequal treatment of workers and tasks. This position, although widely adopted, seems
untenable. As Ludsteck (2003) has pointed out, differentiated pay for different tasks requires that
the tasks can be observed. Hence the “time allocation across tasks” can be controlled directly by
command, and it is not necessary to provide different wages for different tasks and individuals to
induce the required time allocation, as Lindbeck and Snower assume. More generally speaking,
Lindbeck and Snower follow the principal-agent view and assume that the wage structure and the
command structure are substitutes for purposes of directing labor, while the position developed
here maintains that any command structure requires an appropriate wage structure that enables
the command mechanism.
14All this is quite remote from concerns about those kinds of incentives that
are in the focus of the principal–agent paradigm. Such incentives may play a
role in cases where observability is a problem. Within ﬁrms this seems to be less
important, as you cannot compensate or incentivize what you cannot observe.
You can, however, render the performance of tasks more attractive by offering
performance pay, especially in cases where problems of observability do not
arise. It is therefore not surprising that incentives are usually framed as a fair
share in the value that has been created by the worker to the beneﬁt of the ﬁrm.
Such payments are much smaller than principal–agent theory would predict.35
Well-known phenomena like the attenuation of incentives, wage compression,
or selection wages would not be observed if the principal–agent view of the
employment contract were correct.
To phrase these thoughts in still another way: Within markets, prices coor-
dinate various economic activities. Within ﬁrms, coordination is achieved by
the assignment of duties and responsibilities, by direct control and supervision,
and by supplementing all this with fair and consistent compensation structures.
These mechanisms of coordination within ﬁrms are rendered viable by virtue
of normative structures that ultimately build on perceptions of fairness and
legitimacy and are shaped in the past and incessantly remolded by the daily
operations and interactions taking place within the ﬁrm.
9 Routines and Change
The evolutionary theory of the ﬁrm emphasizes the function of routines to
coordinate thedivision of laborwithin ﬁrms. The emphasison routines, although
in many ways quite relevant, hides the fact that the various routines to be found
in a ﬁrm are tied together by consistency requirements. Similar cases must be
treated similarly. Otherwise, entitlements and obligations will not match, and
coordination cannot work smoothly. Further, the evolutionary view tends to
conceive change as brought about by blind trial and error. This is misleading.
Ronald Coase has pointed this out nicely: “The ﬁrm, the market, the legal
system are all social institutions and are the result of purposeful human activity.
35 Frank (1984)
15... natural selection has an IQ of zero. The IQ of businessmen and politicians
may not be high, but it is not zero. Natural selection produces its results by trial
and error over long periods of time. Economic systems, such as the structure
of an industry, may be transformed within a single generation.”36 Economic
change is neither blind nor fully rational.
It seems to me that this “intermediate” character of economic change –
neither blind nor prescient – can be analyzed fruitfully from a consistency
perspective. Firms respond to changing conditions by changing or enlarging
their repertoire of action, and they seek improvements by building on their
competencies. All this must be done in a piecemeal way and using the means at
hand while maintaining overall consistency, even in times of change. The ﬁrm is
not reshaped optimally in response to each and every change in the environment;
rather, the existing routines are kept, or modiﬁed, or extended, and aligned with
each other.37 It would not be “rational” to start anew at each point in time; rather
it is reasonable to respond to new exigencies, or ﬁnd new solutions, by starting
from the prevailing set of routines, norms and customs, and by extending and
changing them to meet new exigencies. As the prevailing set of routines is
tied together by consistency requirements, organizational change is channeled
by these requirements, just as biological change is channeled by physical and
genetic conditions.38
10 Concluding Remarks
The consistency view of organization highlights some often neglected aspects of
organizational performance. It requires transcending the standard assumptions
on human behavior used in economics, as epitomized by the principal–agent view.
36 Coase (1978, 244)
37 Alchian (1984, 47) denies that when taking the principal–agent view to the extreme and
concludes: “It is not silly to consider the entry of a new stockholder to be the creation of a new
ﬁrm.” This neglects the costs of setting up a system of rules that coordinate interaction. Once
this is taken into account, any change (like the entry of a new stockholder) must be integrated
into the existing set of routines, customs, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc norms, rather than creating a new ﬁrm
from scratch.
38 Schlicht (1997)
16Tastes and constraints are not the only determinants of behavior. Rather the
perception of a situation affects attitudes, preferences, and perceived constraints.
All this contributes in shaping behavior. The above discussion was intended to
introduce this thought and to relate it to some selected topics in the theory of
the ﬁrm. What has been left out here is a more detailed examination of possible
empirical predictions and a more systematic discussion of the underlying model
of man.
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